On the Expressivity of Minimal Generic Quantification by Baelde, David
On the Expressivity of Minimal Generic Quantification
David Baelde
To cite this version:
David Baelde. On the Expressivity of Minimal Generic Quantification. Andreas Abel, Christian
Urban. International Workshop on Logical Frameworks and Meta-Languages: Theory and
Practice, Jun 2008, Pittsburgh, United States. 2008. <inria-00284186>
HAL Id: inria-00284186
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00284186
Submitted on 2 Jun 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
LFMTP 2008
On the Expressivity of
Minimal Generic Quantification
Extended Version
David Baelde
INRIA Saclay - Iˆle-de-France & LIX / E´cole Polytechnique
Palaiseau, France
Abstract
We come back to the initial design of the ∇ quantifier by Miller and Tiu, which we call minimal generic quantification.
In the absence of fixed points, it is equivalent to seemingly stronger designs. However, several expected theorems about
(co)inductive specifications can not be derived in that setting. We present a refinement of minimal generic quantification
that brings the expected expressivity while keeping the minimal semantic, which we claim is useful to get natural adequate
specifications. We build on the idea that generic quantification is not a logical connective but one that is defined, like negation
in classical logics. This allows us to use the standard (co)induction rule, but obtain much more expressivity than before. We
show classes of theorems that can now be derived in the logic, and present a few practical examples.
Keywords: Proof theory, generic quantification, fixed points, higher-order abstract syntax.
1 Introduction
A logic is a system that can represent objects, but also provides means to analyze them,
reason about the relationships between these objects. Different logics allow more or less
natural encodings of different object systems. The notion of generic quantification has
been introduced in proof theory in order to obtain logics in which one can naturally spec-
ify systems involving variable bindings, such as programming languages, type systems or
logics. Before detailing more that aspect, let us recall how algebraic specifications can be
logically supported, for three increasingly demanding tasks: computing, model-checking
and reasoning — from the proof-as-programs viewpoint, representing objects, then finite
and finally infinite behaviour functions on those objects.
The purpose of logical frameworks is to allow declarative and adequate representations
of various object systems. The classic example is that natural numbers are in bijection with
normal intuitionistic proofs of N ⊃ (N ⊃ N) ⊃ N. Prolog built on that idea: the search for
objects satisfying the specification is reduced to the search of some normal forms of proofs.
Proof search in the framework provides a mean to compute according to the specification.
A logic should also provide some means to reason about its judgments, and hence
about encoded objects. This is the role of elimination rules. The least is to support case-
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analysis, which turns proof-search intomodel-checking, that is inspecting finite behaviours.
This is obtained by moving to the notion of fixed points. In that setting, nat is defined as
µ(λX.λn.n = 0 ∨ ∃p.n = (s p) ∧ Xn), or simply µ(λX.⊤ ∨ X) if one regards proofs as
programs. And the logic is equipped with the following case-analysis and back-chaining
rules:
Γ, B(µB)t ⊢ G
Γ, µBt ⊢ G
Γ ⊢ B(µB)t
Γ ⊢ µBt
One does not need more for analyzing finite behaviours. Using the left unfolding rule,
one can for example deduce that any natural number is either zero or a successor. It is
interesting to notice that when hypothesis can be exhaustively analyzed in a finite number
of steps, the initial rule (also called axiom rule) becomes useless: after the exhaustive case
analysis, the goal can be built explictly from its fixed point definition. For example, the
Bedwyr [BGM+07] system works under that assumption.
In order to reason about infinite behaviours or infinite collections of objects such as
natural numbers, the initial rule becomes necessary. This raises the question of the identity
of judgments, which is negligible in many cases but crucial for generic judgments. More
expressivity is often needed, coming with the distinction of two dual kinds of fixed points
and their associated deduction principles: least fixed points are represented by inductive
specifications µB and analyzed by induction; greatest fixed points are represented by coin-
ductive specifications νB and are built by coinduction. All this is well-established proof
theory:
Γ, S t ⊢ G BS x ⊢ S x
Γ, µBt ⊢ G
Γ ⊢ S t S x ⊢ BS x
Γ ⊢ νBt
It is important to notice that the addition of more introspective abilities to the logic did
not make it miss the initial target, that is adequate representations. Proofs of nat are still
exactly natural numbers, and proofs of nat ⊃ nat can still be seen as functions from natural
numbers to natural numbers, computed via cut elimination. We shall now contrast that with
the incomplete picture corresponding to the state of the art regarding the specification of
systems involving variable binding.
The higher-order abstract syntax approach [PE88,Mil00] pioneered by Twelf [PS99]
and λProlog [MNPS91] provides an elegant way to represent systems involving variable
binding, encoding the object-level binding by the notion of binding already present in the
logic. In the proof-as-program approach, one uses the abstraction of proofs terms. In the λ-
tree approach, term-level abstractions are used, e.g., encoding the introduction of a generic
variable by an universal quantification:
∀ f . (∀x. term x ⊃ term ( f x)) ⊃ term (abs (λx. f x))
The α-conversion of the logic is then inherited by the represented system. Of course, this
technique only provides elegant encodings when the notions of scope and binding of the
encoded system match those of the encoding logic.
However, the universal quantification only acts as a generic quantification when it oc-
curs positively. On the left hand-side of a sequent, its “for all” semantic makes a difference:
instead of introducing a generic variable, it is expecting a term to substitute for the variable.
In spirit, generic quantification should not require to deal with terms inhabiting the types of
generic variables. This mismatch required new proof-theoretic designs in order to obtain
a satisfying support of case analysis. Several solutions [Tiu06,Pie08,LZH08] have been
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developped, revolving around an essential idea: keeping the generic variables in a context
local to the formula. We shall focus on the earliest design, which is also the simplest in-
carnation of this idea: the ∇ quantifier [MT03,MT05]. It extends sequents with generic
contexts σ surrounding formulas, denoted by σ ⊲ Pσ — we write Pσ to indicate that the
generic variables can occur in the formula, also implicitly assuming that they don’t occur
free in P anymore. We call this early design “minimal generic quantification” because of
the absence of any structural rule for generic contexts. Despite its minimality, it is fully
satisfying for reasoning about finite behaviours, where the identity of judgments does not
matter. Notably, Miller and Tiu have shown that this core support of generic quantifica-
tion, combined with least and greatest fixed points in the logic LINC [Tiu04], is enough for
providing a fully declarative specification of finite pi-calculus and its bisimulation [Tiu05].
Again, the ability to adequately represent objects has not been affected, since ∇ and ∀ are
identical when restricted to positive occurences. When representing objects in the logic, we
are actually only moving object-level binders to the formula-level generic context, which
keeps an exact track of the scope.
Things get significantly more complicated with infinite behaviours. In LINC, the initial
rule requires an exact match (modulo α-conversion) of the generic contexts:
σ ⊲ Pσ ⊢ σ ⊲ Pσ
Without any structural rule on the generic context, this often seems too restrictive. The
design of the induction rule also turns out to be problematic. In the end, the interplay of
minimal generic quantification and fixed points in LINC lacks in expressivity. Theorems
which should intuitively hold are underivable, e.g., ∀x. (∇y. nat x) ⊃ nat x. This has lead
to the development of radically different notions of generic quantification. It is typically
made stronger, in order to always have ∀x. Px ⊃ ∇x. Px and ∇x. Px ⊃ ∃x. Px, which
implies P ≡ ∇x. P when x does not occur free in P. In our opinion, this is not a satisfying
solution: this stronger semantic of generic quantification does not match the needs of some
specifications. Consider for example the specification of provability in some object logic.
The natural fixed-point clause for universal quantification is:
prove Γ (∀ˆ(λx. Px)) := ∇x. prove Γ (Px)
With minimal generic quantification, the generic context exactly represents the signature
of the object sequent. With a stronger generic quantification this is no longer true. Indeed,
we could derive immediately that prove Γ (∀ˆ(λx. P)) ⊃ prove Γ P. This is not wanted
in all cases. In particular, in presence of a cut rule, one would expect that a proof of
such a statement provides a way to eliminate cuts for which the cut-formula contains an
occurence of the (seemingly) vacuous ∀ˆ. This inadequacy can be seen as analogous to the
impossibility to represent directly a linear logic in an intuitionistic framework.
In this paper, we come back to the design of minimal generic quantification. In Sec-
tion 2 we propose the logic µLJ∇ as an alternative that brings the expected expressivity.
The key is a better interaction of fixed point constructions and generic quantificaton, which
is not treated as a logical connective anymore. Structural rules on the generic context will
still not be admitted in general, allowing adequate representations of systems following a
strict management of variables. In Section 3 we study the meta-theory of µLJ∇, notably ex-
hibiting a large syntactic class of formulas for which structural rules can in fact be derived.
Finally, we illustrate how the logic can be practically used on a few significant examples in
Section 4.
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2 Definitions
We shall work on two logics: µLJ∇0 which incarnates the initial design of minimal generic
quantification, and its corrected version µLJ∇ where ∇ is no more a logical connective. In
both systems, we are not going to consider atoms, that is predicate constants. By essence,
atoms have an undefined behaviour, unlike fixed points. If one wants to obtain ∇x. p ⊃ p
for an atom p, there is no other option than adding it as a rule in the logic, whereas with
a fixed point the theorem could be obtained by (co)induction. Not considering atoms is
motivated practically, because users of a logic usually work on defined notions, but also
theoretically, as we find important for the logician to study what can be derived from the
simplest definition before playing the game of choosing which axioms to force uniformly.
In the following, the type of formulas is o, and γ denotes a term type, that is any simple
type in which o does not occur. Terms are denoted by u, v, t; formulas by P,Q, S ; term
variables by x, y, z; and predicate variables by p, q. We write vectors as
−→
t , and sometimes
(ti)i for readability. In all systems considered in this paper, formulas are of the following
forms:
P ::= P ∧ P | P ∨ P | P ⊃ P | ⊤ | ⊥
| ∃γx.Px | ∀γx.Px | ∇γx.Px | s
γ
= t | s
γ
, t | µγ1...γnB
−→
t | νγ1...γnB
−→
t
The quantifiers have type (γ → o) → o and the equality and inequality have type γ → γ →
o. The connectives µ and ν have type (τ → τ) → τ where τ is γ1 → · · · → γn → o for some
arity n ≥ 0. Formulas with top-level connective µ or ν are called fixed point expressions
and can be arbitrarily nested. The first argument of a fixed point expression, denoted by B,
is called its body. For consistency, it is required to be monotonic: negative occurences of
the bound predicate variable are forbidden.
Figure 1 defines µLJ=, the basic system on top of which are built logics supporting
generic quantification. It consists in first-order propositional intuitionistic logic extended
with fixed points and equality. For background and details about definitions, fixed points
and the treatment of equality, we refer the reader to [SH93,MM97,Tiu04,BGM+07].
Generic contexts are lists of typed term variables, denoted by σ or ζ. If σ is a generic
context (x1 : γ1, . . . , xn : γn) we denote by σ → γ the type γ1 → . . . → γn → γ, and call it
γ lifted over σ. Analogously, we talk of lifted variables when they have a lifted type. We
also use a generic context as a list of terms, writing (Fσ) for ((Fx1) . . . xn). Similarly, f (xi)i
stands for (( f x1) . . . xn).
Type annotations are omitted for conciseness most of the time, but can be recovered
from the context. In order to make type inference easier, we use the convention of naming
x′ a lifted version of x. Finally, we use the convention that when we write (λa.t), the
variable a does not occur free in t.
2.1 The logic µLJ∇0
The logic µLJ∇0 is essentially the same as LINC [Tiu04]. The only difference lies in the
use of fixed points rather than definitions. This slight shift of point of view brings more
expressivity, but most importantly gives more flexibility when working on the logic.
The system is obtained from µLJ= by enriching the sequent structure, surrounding each
formula by a local generic context which binds generic variables in the formula. A formula
surrounded by its generic context forms a generic judgment, denoted by G. Variables are
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Propositional intuitionistic logic
Γ, P ⊢ P Γ,⊥ ⊢ P Γ ⊢ ⊤
Γ, P, P′ ⊢ Q
Γ, P ∧ P′ ⊢ Q
Γ ⊢ P Γ ⊢ Q
Γ ⊢ P ∧ Q
Γ, P ⊢ Q Γ, P′ ⊢ Q
Γ, P ∨ P′ ⊢ Q
Γ ⊢ P
Γ ⊢ P ∨ P′
Γ ⊢ P′
Γ ⊢ P ∨ P′
Γ ⊢ P Γ, P′ ⊢ Q
Γ, P ⊃ P′ ⊢ Q
Γ, P ⊢ Q
Γ ⊢ P ⊃ Q
First-order structure
Γ, Ph ⊢ Q
Γ,∃x.Px ⊢ Q
Γ ⊢ Pt
Γ ⊢ ∃x.Px
Γ, Pt ⊢ Q
Γ,∀x.Px ⊢ Q
Γ ⊢ Ph
Γ ⊢ ∀x.Px
{(Γ ⊢ Q)θ : tθ
.
= t′θ}
Γ, t = t′ ⊢ Q Γ ⊢ t = t
Fixed points
Γ, S t ⊢ P BS x ⊢ S x
Γ, µBt ⊢ P
Γ ⊢ B(µB)t
Γ ⊢ µBt
Γ, B(νB)t ⊢ P
Γ, νBt ⊢ P
Γ ⊢ S t S x ⊢ BS x
Γ ⊢ νBt
Fig. 1. Inference rules for µLJ= and µLJ∇. The eigenvariable h does not occur free in the conclusion sequent of ∀-R and ∃-L,
and S is closed in µ-L and ν-R.
introduced in the new context by generic quantification:
Γ, (σ, x) ⊲ Pσx ⊢ G
Γ, σ ⊲ ∇x.Pσx ⊢ G
Γ ⊢ (σ, x) ⊲ Pσx
Γ ⊢ σ ⊲ ∇x.Pσx
Propositional deduction rules are adapted in an orthogonal fashion. Under the generic
context, the reasoning takes place as before, for example:
σ ⊲ Pσ ⊢ σ ⊲ Pσ
Γ ⊢ σ ⊲ Pσ Γ, σ ⊲ Qσ ⊢ G
Γ, σ ⊲ Pσ ⊃ Qσ ⊢ G
Γ, σ ⊲ Pσ ⊢ σ ⊲ Qσ
Γ ⊢ σ ⊲ Pσ ⊃ Qσ
The first-order rules interact with the generic context, causing a lifting of terms and term
variables. In the rules for universal quantification, if x has type γ then t and the eigenvari-
able h have type σ → γ:
Σ;Γ, σ ⊲ Pσ(tσ) ⊢ G
Σ;Γ, σ ⊲ ∀x.Pσx ⊢ G
Σ, h;Γ ⊢ σ ⊲ Pσ(hσ)
Σ;Γ ⊢ σ ⊲ ∀x.Pσx
{(Γ ⊢ G)θ : tθ
.
= t′θ}
Γ, σ ⊲ tσ = t′σ ⊢ G Γ ⊢ σ ⊲ tσ = tσ
At this point, we have described how the logic treats finite behaviour formulas, those
that do not involve fixed points. In that setting, the deduction rules can be read as equiv-
alences, for example ∇x. Px ∧ Qx ≡ (∇x. Px) ∧ (∇x. Qx), which allow to eliminate ∇ by
pushing it down through logical connectives, eventually disappearing, for example thanks
to (∇x. ux = vx) ≡ u = v. A similar observation is that any proof of a finite behaviour can
be η-expanded until it does not use the initial rule anymore, but where the only leafs are the
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rules for ⊤,⊥ and equality. Both observations imply that there is no need to ever compare
two generic contexts, and hence no need to consider structural rules for them. Note, how-
ever that the dynamic aspect of the second one makes it stronger; for example it extends to
fixed points, giving rise to the Bedwyr system.
The fixed point rules are adapted as follows:
Γ, σ ⊲ S (tσ) ⊢ P BS x ⊢ S x
Γ, σ ⊲ µB(tσ) ⊢ P
Γ ⊢ σ ⊲ B(µB)(tσ)
Γ ⊢ σ ⊲ µB(tσ)
The extended unfolding rule states that liftings of a fixed point unfold just like the original
version. The induction rule seems less natural, essentially stating that liftings of the invari-
ants of a fixed point are invariants of its liftings. Tiu noticed [Tiu04] that it was too weak,
since it does not allow any modification of the generic context σ when inducting under
it. As a consequence, it is impossible to prove things like ∀x. (∇a. nat x) ⊃ nat x. This
seems unfortunate because nat, defined as a fixed point, clearly does not rely on the generic
context.
2.2 µLJ∇: treating ∇ as a non-logical connective
The self-duality of generic quantification, as well as its ability to commute with almost
all connectives of µLJ∇0 , suggests that it might not be a logical connective but rather a
defined one, like negation in classical logics. Indeed, we shall define a formula transforma-
tion φ that transforms a formula into one where the ∇ quantifiers only occur above bound
predicate variables inside fixed point constructions. This is in slight contrast with the clas-
sical negation which can be eliminated statically even inside fixed points, because of the
monotonicity constraint. The important point remains: since ∇ does not occur anymore at
toplevel in a sequent, it loses its logical role.
The logic µLJ∇ has the same rules as µLJ=, cf. Figure 1. Unlike µLJ∇0 , it has no extra
sequent structure. The rules for fixed points are written the same way, but the implicit
elimination of toplevel ∇ quantifiers which might occur in BS will play a critical role.
Γ, S t ⊢ P BS x ⊢ S x
Γ, µBt ⊢ P
Γ ⊢ B(µB)t
Γ ⊢ µBt
We define the connective ∇ by identifying a formula F at toplevel in a sequent with
φ(F) where ∇ does not occur anymore except inside fixed point bodies. The transforma-
tion is parametrized by two contexts initially empty, and written φΓσ(P|Γ|σ). Here, σ is a
generic context, i.e., a list of term variables. The context Γ contains associations of the form
〈p, σ, p′〉 where p is a predicate variable of type γ, σ = x1 : γ1, . . . , xn : γn is a generic
context and p′ is an other predicate variable of type γ1 → . . . → γn → γ. The support of Γ,
written |Γ|, is the variables p. As indicated by the notation in P|Γ|σ, the predicate variables
of |Γ| and the term variables of σ may occur in the original formula. These occurences are
bound by the two contexts. In the transformed formula only the p′ will be found. Finally,
the order does not matter in Γ unlike in σ. The inductive definition of the transformation is
given on Figure 2.
That full definition can be reduced to the definition of the behaviour of φ on term and
predicate abstractions and variables, extended in an orthogonal way to the full language of
formulas. For doing so, one should carefully separate the binding and logical aspects of
∀,∃, µ and ν. Along these lines, we shall write φ applied not only to formulas but also to
formulas abstracted over terms such as in φσ(µB), or formulas and terms such as in µφσ(B).
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φΓσ(∇x. P|Γ|σx) ≡ φ
Γ
σ,x(P|Γ|σx)
φΓσ(∀x. P|Γ|σx) ≡ ∀x
′. φΓσ(P|Γ|σ(x
′σ)) φΓσ(∃x. P|Γ|σx) ≡ ∃x
′. φΓσ(P|Γ|σ(x
′σ))
φΓσ(µ(λpλ
−→x . B|Γ|pσ−→x )
−−→
(tσ)) ≡ µ(λp′λ−→y . φ
Γ,〈p,σ,p′〉
σ (B|Γ|pσ
−−→
(yσ)))
−→
t
φΓσ(ν(λpλ
−→x . B|Γ|pσ−→x )
−−→
(tσ)) ≡ ν(λp′λ−→y . φ
Γ,〈p,σ,p′〉
σ (B|Γ|pσ
−−→
(yσ)))
−→
t
φΓσ(a(tσ)) ≡ ∇σ. a(tσ) φ
Γ,〈p,σ,p′〉
σσ′
(p(tσσ′)) ≡ ∇σ′. p′(λσ. tσσ′)
φΓσ(uσ = vσ) ≡ u = v φ
Γ
σ(⊤) ≡ ⊤ φ
Γ
σ(⊤) ≡ ⊤
φΓσ(P|Γ|σ ∧ Q|Γ|σ) ≡ φ
Γ
σ(P|Γ|σ) ∧ φ
Γ
σ(Q|Γ|σ)
φΓσ(P|Γ|σ ∨ Q|Γ|σ) ≡ φ
Γ
σ(P|Γ|σ) ∨ φ
Γ
σ(Q|Γ|σ)
φΓσ(P|Γ|σ ⊃ Q|Γ|σ) ≡ φ
Γ
σ(P|Γ|σ) ⊃ φ
Γ
σ(Q|Γ|σ)
Fig. 2. The transformation φ defining ∇
Example 2.1 The elimination of ∇ on finite-behaviour formulas described for µLJ∇0 in
Section 2.1 is now an identity. In µLJ∇ the two following formulas are identified:
∇x.∀y.∇z.y = z ⊃ ⊥ ≡ ∀y′.(λxz.y′x) = (λxz.z) ⊃ ⊥
Example 2.2 We define the well-formedness of terms in a purely abstractive language,
assuming constants nil :: lst, cons :: α → lst → lst and abs :: (α → tm) → tm, as follows:
mem
de f
= µ(λMλxλΓ. ∃hd∃tl. Γ = (cons hd tl) ∧ (x = hd ∨ M x tl))
term
de f
= µ(λTλΓλt. mem t Γ ∨ ∃ f . t = abs f ∧ ∇αx. T (cons x Γ) ( f x))
It does not look very different from µLJ∇0 . But the ∇ inside the body of the fixed point
term should be read as a suspensed lifting, waiting for the instantiation of T . In a sense,
the fixed point does not only define a predicate, but rather a family of liftings. Let us now
consider the lifting of the definitions of mem and term. For readability we lift over an other
type than α:
φ(y:β)(mem)
de f
=
µ(λM′λx′λΓ′. ∃hd′∃tl′. Γ′ = (λβy. cons (hd
′ y) (tl′ y)) ∧ (x′ = hd′ ∨ M′ x′ tl′))
φ(y:β)(term)
de f
= µ(λT ′λΓ′λt′. φ(y:β)(mem) t
′ Γ′ ∨
∃ f ′. t′ = (λβy.abs ( f
′y)) ∧ ∇x. T ′ (λβy. cons x (Γ
′y)) (λβy. f
′yx))
In other words, the induction on φ(y:β)(term) corresponds to the following principle, where
S is the tentative invariant:
(∀Γ′∀x′. φ(y:β)(mem) x
′ Γ′ ⊃ S Γ′ x′)
⊃ (∀Γ′∀ f ′. φ(x:α)(S ) (λxλy. cons x (Γ
′y)) (λxλy. f ′yx) ⊃ S Γ′ (λy. abs ( f ′y)))
⊃ (∀Γ′∀t′. φ(y:β)(term) Γ
′ t′ ⊃ S Γ′ t′)
For example it can be used with the invariant:
S := λΓ′λx′.∀Γ∀x. (Γ′ = (λy.Γ) ∧ x′ = (λy.x)) ⊃ term Γ x
After a similar sub-induction on φ(y:β)(mem) one will have obtained a derivation of:
∀Γ∀x. (∇y. term Γ x) ⊃ term Γ x
7
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3 The theory of µLJ∇
The lifting transformation behaves nicely with respect to first-order abstraction, i.e.,
φσ(Fσ(tσ)) ≡ ((λx
′. φσ(Fσ(x
′σ)))t). Unfortunately, the same does not hold for second-
order abstraction: φσ(B)φσ(S ) is not necessarily the same as φσ(BS ). Consider an ab-
straction B := (λp . . .∇σ′(. . . p . . .)). In φσ(BS ) the occurence of p will become φσσ′(S )
whereas in φσ(B)φσ(S ) it becomes φσ′(φσ(S )).
This is technically complicating the metatheory, but our attempts to change the defi-
nition and avoid that have been unsuccessful. In fact, this permutation of names can be
understood as inherent to the identifaction of ∇σ. µB and µφσ(B). Indeed, these two fixed
points reveal two different prefixes of generic quantifiers after n unfoldings, respectively
σ(σ′)n and (σ′)nσ.
We shall establish, however, that the permutation of names does not affect provability.
This can be derived in the logic itself, not only at the meta level. It will provide a way to
bridge the gap between φσ(BS ) and φσ(B)φσ(S ) by translating all permuted instances.
Proposition 3.1 For any formula P, and any two generic contexts σ and σ∗ permutations
of each other, it is provable that (∇σ. Pσ) ⊃ (∇σ∗. Pσ).
The proof basically builds a corrected η-expansion, carrying the permutability from ele-
mentary formulas (equality, ⊤ and ⊥) through all connectives including µ and ν. In a sense,
there is nothing clever in it: at any point there is only one choice that keeps things well-
typed. That said, it is a good test for the logic to check that everything goes as expected.
The details of this proof, as for other propositions of this section, are given in Appendix A.
Corollary 3.2 Proposition 3.1 actually provides a mean to transform a derivation into an-
other one establishing the same sequent where some instances of φσ(F) have been replaced
by some permutation φσ∗(F): this is done by cutting against η-expansions of the derivations
provided by the proposition. In particular, it allows to compensate the difference between
φσ(B)φσ(S ) and φσ(BS ).
Definition 3.3 We extend the notion of lifting to sequents:
φσ
(
x1, . . . , xn; P1(xi)i, . . . , Pm(xi)i ⊢ Q(xi)i
)
:=
x′
1
, . . . , x′n; φσ(P1(x
′
i
σ)i), . . . , φσ(Pm(x
′
i
σ)i) ⊢ φσ(Q(x
′
i
σ)i)
Proposition 3.4 (Lifting derivations) For any σ, the provability of Σ;Γ ⊢ P implies that
of φσ(Σ;Γ ⊢ P)
1 .
This allows one to read a proof of (∀t. (∇a. p t) ⊃ p t) as not only establishing that
the provability of p in the context of one unused generic variable entails that of p in the
empty context, but more generally that the provability is stable by removal of an unused
variable from any context. This is what makes our system expressive without any need for
concrete manipulations of the context and other complex devices such as quantifications
over all generic contexts.
Proposition 3.5 (Conservativity & expressivity) We call 0-provability the provability
1 We do not follow the notational conventions here: of course, the variables of Σ can occur in Γ and P, unlike those of σ.
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without any use of the (co)induction rules. Let P be a formula, possibly involving ∇ quan-
tifications.
(i) The 0-provability of P in µLJ∇0 is equivalent to its 0-provability in µLJ∇.
(ii) Moreover, the provability of P in µLJ∇0 implies its provability in µLJ∇,
(iii) but the converse is false.
Proof. Each direction of (i) is done by induction on the 0-derivation. Both are straight-
forward proof transformation similar to those detailed before, including corrective cuts
(cf. Corollary 3.2) as in Proposition 3.4. For (ii) we add the translation of an induction in
µLJ∇0 to µLJ∇, which amounts to lift the invariant and the invariance proof. Finally, (iii)
shall be seen later, with the ability to weaken the generic context in some cases in µLJ∇,
which is impossible in µLJ∇0 . 
3.1 Cut-elimination
We adapt the proof reductions involved in cut-elimination, and argue that the termination is
not affected, leaving a detailed proof of that for future work. The only novelty is the trans-
formation φ. It only affects second-order instantiations in fixed point unfoldings, induction
and coinduction. It does not affect several important properties of the system: proofs can be
instantiated, the signature can be enriched, etc. The non-trivial part is adapting the reduc-
tion for eliminating a cut on a fixed point. We only show the case of the least fixed point,
the greatest being similar.
The essential reduction for least fixed point is the following:
ΠS
BS−→x ⊢ S−→x
Π′
Γ, S
−→
t ⊢ P
Γ, µB
−→
t ⊢ P
Π
Γ ⊢ µB
−→
t
Γ ⊢ P −→
Π′
Γ, S
−→
t ⊢ P
f old(Π,ΠS )
Γ ⊢ S
−→
t
Γ ⊢ P
Where the f old(Π,ΠS ) transformation replaces in Π all unfoldings of µB by a cut
against ΠS . More precisely, since the unfoldings might be lifted, occurences of φσ(µB) =
µ(φσ(B)) are replaced by φσ(S ):
...
Γ ⊢ φσ(B)(µ(φσ(B)))
−→
t
Γ ⊢ µ(φσ(B))
−→
t
µR
−→
...
φσ(B)φσ(S )
−→
t ⊢ φσ(S )
−→
t Γ ⊢ φσ(B)φσ(S )
−→
t
Γ ⊢ φσ(S )
−→
t
cut
To complete this, one must build from ΠS , for a given σ and
−→
t , a proof of φσ(B)φσ(S )
−→
t ⊢
φσ(S )
−→
t . Using Proposition 3.4 on ΠS we get a derivation of φσ(BS
−→x ) ⊢ φσ(S
−→x ). Then,
Corallary 3.2 gives a proof of φσ(B)φσ(S )
−→x ⊢ φσ(S )
−→x where −→x can finally be instantiated
by
−→
t .
We leave the termination of the reduction for further work. Strictly speaking, cut-
elimination has not been established even for µLJ∇0 , which does not have the stratification
constraints on which is built the proof for LINC [Tiu04]. However, based on earlier work
on µMALL= [BM07], we believe that it holds under the simple constraint of monotonicity.
But even with the stratification constraint on fixed points, the termination of cut-elimination
for LINC does not carry easily to µLJ∇, because of the extra cuts inserted in the above
reduction for translating between φ(BS ) and φ(B)φ(S ).
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3.2 Structural rules on the generic context
Minimal generic quantification in µLJ∇0 did not assume an infinity of undistinguishable
generic variables, hence the absence of an immediate way of obtaining strengthening
or exchange on generic contexts. This has not been changed with µLJ∇. For example,
(∇γx. ⊤) ⊃ (∃γx. ⊤) still can not be derived without assuming the non-vacuity of γ, which
would make even (∃γx. ⊤) alone derivable. Symmetrically, ∀ does not imply ∇ in general.
And vacuous generic quantifications can not a priori be added or removed.
We show, however, that the missing generic strengthening and weakening are actually
derivable for a reasonable class of formulas. On such formulas, the minimality does not
make generic quantification weaker than other approaches, just as in the finite behaviour
case. The essential idea for obtaining generic strengthening, that is (∇x. P) ⊃ P, is to forbid
positive occurences of existential quantification, unless they are guarded by a formula that
ensures that the existential variable does not depend on the extra generic variable x.
Definition 3.6 A guard is a formula G such that for any σ:
∀y′. φxσ(Gσ(y
′xσ)) ⊃ ∃y. y′ = (λx. y) ∧ φσ(Gσ(yσ))
A typical guard would be an equality (λσλy. uσy = vσy) such that all unifiers of
(λxσ. uσ(y′xσ) = vσ(y′xσ)) set y′ := λxλσ.yσ for some y. This holds for the equalities
found in most fixed point definitions, which fully define the newly introduced existential
variable as a compound or a sub-term of the pre-existing terms.
Definition 3.7 The fragments W and S (respectively standing for Weakening and
Strengthening) are mutually defined by the following grammar, where G denotes a guard:
W ::= W∧W | W ∨W | ⊤ | ⊥ | u = v | ∇x.W | µW | νW
| S ⊃W | ∃x. W | ∀x. Gx ⊃ W
S ::= S ∧ S | S ∨ S | ⊤ | ⊥ | u = v | ∇x.S | µS | νS
| W ⊃ S | ∀x. S | ∃x. Gx ∧ S
Proposition 3.8 For any formula W ∈ W (resp. S ∈ S) it is provable that W ⊃ ∇x. W
(resp. ∇x. S ⊃ S ).
An other way to put it, for example, is that the following rules are admissible in µLJ∇:
Γ, σ, σ′ ⊲ Sσσ′ ⊢ G
Γ, σ, x, σ′ ⊲ Sσσ′ ⊢ G
Γ ⊢ σ,σ′ ⊲Wσσ′
Γ ⊢ σ, x, σ′ ⊲Wσσ′
Proposition 3.8 is very useful in pratice. Indeed, most common fixed points (nat, mem,
append, term, typeo f . . . ) are both in S and W: they do not involve any universal quan-
tification and the existential quantifications are guarded by equalities. Most of the time, the
existentials are actually very weak in that they do not even require any invention, such as
in ∃y. x = s y ∧ . . ..
Example 3.9 Coming back to the introductory discussion about adequacy, the typical ex-
ample of a fixed point that does not fall in S is provability in an object logic with a cut rule.
Indeed, the cut rule involves an existential quantification that is not guarded at all, and can
notably range over variables present in the object-level signature (that is the generic con-
text) even though not anywhere else in the object sequent (that is the parameters of our fixed
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point). Thus, deriving prove Γ (∀ˆ(λx. P)) ⊃ prove Γ P necessarily involves the description
of at least a limited form of cut-elimination that removes the cut-formulas involving the
allegedly useless generic variable x. It seems reasonable that such a non-trivial property of
the encoded logic is not given for free by the logical framework but has to be worked out
the user.
Another example of guard would be nat itself, as it forces its parameter to be fully
defined in terms of the constants zero and successor. We let the reader check that the fol-
lowing can be derived in µLJ∇: (∇x. nat(y′x) ⊃ ∃y. y′ = (λx.y) ∧ nat y. More interestingly,
it should be possible to characterize a fragment of valid guards, which could build on top
of guards like our W and S did, such that from a basic guard (e.g., λy. x = s y) one could
derive an other (e.g., nat), and an other (e.g., natlist), etc.
4 Practical use of µLJ∇
We describe here a few significant examples of what can be done with µLJ∇. These ex-
amples have been checked 2 using the interactive theorem prover Taci [SBM07], an un-
released tool from the Slimmer project. Taci is a simple generic tactic-based interactive
theorem prover, in which a logician can plug his own logic as an OCaml module. Starting
with the initial specification of µLJ=, we added support for the transformation φ, obtaining
a convenient implementation of µLJ∇. Formulas are not always manipulated in φ-normal
form, but generic variables can occur in an explicit generic context. The elimination of
toplevel generic quantifications and contexts is triggered by the tactic abstract, usually
before applying the induction rule.
It currently provides little automation, incarnated by the tactic prove which performs
a focused proof-search. It treats fixed points as described in [BM07] but is still not able to
infer invariants, and is thus limited to unfoldings. Ongoing work in that direction promises
much more automation in these simple developments. In particular, instances of all proper-
ties proved in this paper would actually be established automatically by simple heuristics:
in our proofs, when we build a derivation using the induction rule, the invariant can be
infered from the conclusion. Bureaucratic lemmas such as strengthening of generic quan-
tification, but also more subtle things, detailed in the next example, would not be a burden
for the user anymore: the cost of having a minimal generic quantification would vanish.
4.1 The copy program
In that example we shall work on a representation of untyped λ-terms. We assume a sig-
nature with a type tm and two constants: app of type tm → tm → tm and abs of type
(tm → tm) → tm. Notice that since these are term-level constants and not fixed point defi-
nitions, there is nothing wrong with negative occurence of tm in the type of abs. The copy
program is defined as follows in λProlog:
copy (app M N) (app P Q) := copy M P, copy N Q.
copy (abs M) (abs P) :=
pi x\ pi y\ copy x y -> copy (M x) (N y).
2 However, the code shown in this section is often not valid for Taci, but has been simplified for readability.
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It can be used for example to substitute a term into another: copy A B -> copy M N
requires that N is M where some (but not necessarily all) occurences of A are changed into
B.
There are mainly two approaches for encoding such a program in our logic. The first
one is essentially the two-level approach [MM02] taken for example in the Abella sys-
tem [Gac08]. It consists in specifying λProlog proof-search as an object logic, and reason-
ing about its behaviour on the copy program. Given the initial formulation of the problem,
this is best from an adequacy point of view, but it is heavy and notably does not allow direct
inductions on the structure of copy. Instead, we encode the program directly. We argue
that this preserves most essential points, and is adequate.
The encoding of the universal quantification in the abstraction clause is a ∇ quantifica-
tion, reflecting the introduction of a generic variable. In order to encode in a monotonic
way the implication in that abs clause, we introduce a context parameter representing the
copy atoms present in the λProlog context. In the encoding, a new clause appears, stating
that if copy M N is found in the context, then it holds.
copy := µ copy. λΓMN.
〈M,N〉 ∈ Γ
∨ (∃M1M2N1N2. M = (app M1 M2) ∧ N = (app N1 N2) ∧
copy Γ M1 N1 ∧ copy Γ M2 N2)
∨ (∃M1N1. M = (abs M1) ∧ N = (abs N1) ∧
∇xy. copy (〈x, y〉 :: Γ) (M1x) (N1y))
We shall prove an useful fact about that inductive definition:
∀MN. copy [] M N ⊃ M = N
This property should be proved by induction over copy. A naive invariant would be that
the context contains only pairs (m,m). It does not hold: when going under an abstraction,
two generic variables are introduced, marked equal in the context Γ. Since they are generic,
it does not break the result, but does make the invariant more complex.
In fact, we proceed by proving that copy implies eq, where eq is defined as a least fixed
point mostly like copy except for its abstraction clause:
eq (abs M) (abs N) := ∇x. eq (〈x, x〉 :: Γ) (M x) (N x)
For eq, it is now easy to show that if the context contains only pairs (m,m), it will remain
true and hence eq implies equality. It remains to show that copy implies eq, which actually
holds for any Γ. This is done by induction over copy, the interesting case being that of
abstraction:
∀ΓMN. (∇ab. eq ((a, b) :: Γ) (M a) (N b))
⊃ (∇a . eq ((a, a) :: Γ) (M a) (N a))
This goal really expresses the heart of our problem with the shape of the context. It
requires an induction under two generic quantifications. Basically, the invariant should
state that two generic variables can be merged. After having lifted eq over the generic
quantifications on a and b, this can actually be written elegantly as a simple invariant, and
the proof of invariance is straightforward:
λΓ′′M′′N′′. ∇a. eq (Γ′′ a a) (M′′ a a) (N′′ a a)
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We do not know of any other system where it is possible to obtain the name merging
principle from the induction rule in such a direct way. The proofs cited above can however
be carried out in other logics, for example in LG [Tiu06] as pointed out by Gacek, thanks
to the strengthening on names. Since strengthening and exchange are also admissible in
µLJ∇ for copy and eq, that gives alternate, less direct proofs in our system.
4.2 λ-calculus
We now discuss the specification of simply typed λ-calculus a` la Church, and the proofs of
subject reduction and determinacy of typing. The signature for terms will consist of two
types: ty for simple types and tm for λ-terms; two constants for terms: app :: tm → tm →
tm and lambda :: ty → (tm → tm) → tm; the constant arrow :: ty → ty → ty for types, as
well as some arbitrary base types.
We shall not detail the definition of a predicate bind such that when Γ is a list of pairs
representing bindings, bind Γ k v expresses that 〈k, v〉 ∈ Γ. We define a least fixed point
typeof such that the typing judgement (Γ ⊢Λ
→
m : t) is represented by (typeof Γ m t):
inductive typeof G M T :=
(bind G M T) ;
(sigma t\m1\m2\
M = (app m1 m2), typeof G m1 (arrow t T), typeof G m2 a) ;
(sigma t\t’\f\
M = lambda t f, T = arrow t t’,
nabla x\ typeof (cons (pair x t) G) (f x) t’).
Along these lines, we also specify one-step β-reduction as a least fixed point called one,
and prove subject reduction as well as determinacy of typing. However, the statement of
the theorems required particular care. In this style of specification, a variable is nothing
but a placeholder for a term. Note for example that in the typing relation, nothing forbids
the typing context Γ to contain constructed terms, instead of only variables as usual. This
seems interesting, but certainly differs from the informal practice. One can try to stick to the
usual notion of context; for example we established subject reduction under the assumption
that the context does not contain constructed terms:
theorem subject_reduction :
pi m\n\ one m n =>
pi G\
(pi t\a\t’\ bind G (lambda t a) t’ => false) =>
(pi a\b\t’\ bind G (app a b) t’ => false) =>
pi t\ typeof G m t => typeof G n t.
For typed determinacy, we used an alternative definition of the notion of context. Instead of
assuming that keys are unique and not constructed, we assumed that each binding satisfied
type determinacy:
context G := pi x\t\ bind G x t => pi t’\ typeof G x t’ => t=t’.
theorem type_determinacy :
pi g\x\t\ typeof g x t => context g => pi t’\ typeof g x t’ => t=t’.
This formulation implies new branches compared to the usual proof. However they are triv-
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ially treated, and overall the proof is not more complex than with more traditional notions
of contexts. Moreover, the resulting theorem is also slightly stronger than the usual one, as
it allows richer contexts.
We also explored a named style of specification, which involves the addition of a type n
for free variables and a constructor var :: n → tm. The typing relation can then be written
as follows:
inductive typeof G M T :=
(sigma v\ M = var v, bind G v T) ;
(sigma t\m1\m2\
M = app m1 m2, typeof G m1 (arrow t T), typeof G m2 t) ;
(sigma t\t’\f\
M = lambda t f, T = arrow t t’,
nabla x\ typeof (cons (pair x t) G) (f (var x)) t’).
With that specification, typing contexts now contain only variables, which are objects
of a different kind than terms. This lead to a significantly shorter proof of type determinacy,
requiring less bureaucracy.
With both styles of specification, the µLJ∇ proof of subject reduction could not be
completly built within Taci, because our tool currently only strictly supports higher-order
patterns. With the first specification, only a small gap was left because of that. However,
the named style of specification was very inconvenient to work with, producing much more
unifications outside of the fragment, for example (x\var x) = (x\m (var x)). In any
case, this is only a problem of the implementation, not of the logic.
5 Conclusion
Thanks to a reformulation of the ∇ quantifier as a defined connective, we have revealed the
expressivity of minimal generic quantification in presence of fixed points. This resulted in
the logic µLJ∇, which is a good candidate for adequately representing objects, and reason-
ing in an expressive way about them.
We have notably exhibited classes of formulas for which generic weakening and
strengthening could be derived. It should be possible to build other classes corresponding to
other common logical principles, such as (∇x. Px) ⊃ (∀x. Px), or maybe even more exotic
ones like (∇xy. Pxy) ⊃ (∇x. Pxx). More importantly, these results should be integrated in
mechanized theorem provers to simplify their use. In fact, we claim that simple inductive
theorem proving heuristics should be able to achieve this goal, since the derivations do not
involve clever invariants. Regarding automated theorem proving, an other strength of µLJ∇
is that its rules are standard ones, the only novelty being in the quotienting of the formulas
modulo the lifting φ. Thus, results and heuristics for µLJ= should immediately extend to
µLJ∇.
From a theoretical point of view, we expect that the essential ideas behind the design of
µLJ∇ could be put to work in other settings if needed. For example, adding structural rules
to µLJ∇0 , i.e., working in LG, brings enough expressivity for many non-trivial examples,
but it is still unknown if that approach is strictly more expressive. It might not be, as some
trivial theorems of µLJ∇ do not seem to be provable in LG, such as ∀lx′. (∇n.mem l (x′ n)) ⊃
∃x. x′ = (λn. x) ∧ mem l x.
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Our system seems closely related in spirit to [Pie08] which also manages contexts in
a strict way. But it is difficult to clearly relate the two approaches, since ours is based on
first-order logic while Pientka’s is purely computational but higher-order. Extending our
system to higher-order logic would be challenging but interesting, and should allow for a
better comparison with systems based on the proof-as-program viewpoint.
Acknowledgments. I am grateful to Andrew Gacek, Dale Miller, Gopalan Nadathur and
Alwen Tiu for many insightful discussions on this topic.
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A Proofs
Proposition 3.1 For any formula F, and any two generic contexts σ and σ∗ permutations
of each other, it is provable that (∇σ.Fσ ⊃ ∇σ∗.Fσ).
Proof. For any term abstraction F, for any σ and σ′ permutations of each other, we denote
by [F]σ
σ′
the formula λx. F(λσ′.xσ). In that proof let us refer to the original σ as σ0. For
any extension σ0σ
′ of the context σ0 we shall denote by (σ0σ
′)∗ the context σ∗
0
σ′.
We shall prove the following generalization, by induction on B. Let (σi) be a family
of extensions of σ0, (Fi)i be a family of fixed points of types (σ
∗
i
→ γ) → o, and σ be an
extension of all the σi. Then we have:
(λ
−→
p′. φΓσ(Bσ
−→p ))([Fi]
σi
σ∗
i
)i ⊢ (λ
−→
p∗. φΓ
∗
σ∗(Bσ
−→p ))(Fi)i
Where Γ := 〈p1, σ1, p
′
1
〉, . . . , 〈pn, σn, p
′
n〉 and Γ
∗ := 〈p1, σ
∗
1
, p∗
1
〉, . . . , 〈pn, σ
∗
n, p
∗
n〉, which
implies that if pi is of type γi → o then p
′
i
has type (σi → γi) → o and p
∗
i
has type
(σ∗
i
→ γi) → o.
• The cases of units (⊤,⊥) and covariant propositional connectives (∧,∨) can be easily
checked. The case of ⊃ relies on the symmetry of our goal, which allows us to conclude
by induction hypothesis after a negation, with the respective roles of σ0, (σi)i, σ, Fi and
σ∗
0
, (σ∗
i
)i, σ
∗, [Fi]
σi
σ∗
i
being exchanged— notice in particular that [[F]σ
σ∗
]σ
∗
σ ≡ F. The case
for equality consists in checking that u = v ⊢ (λσ∗.uσ) = (λσ∗.vσ).
• If B starts with a generic quantification then σ are extended, and we can conclude by
induction hypothesis.
• For first-order quantification, the two cases are symmetric. We treat only the universal
case, that is when B is of the form (λσλ−→p . ∀x. B′σx−→p ). For clarity we ignore the fixed
point parameters, which do not interfere. Essentially, we have to establish φσ(∀x. Fσx) ⊢
φσ∗(∀x. Fσx), that is ∀x. φσ(Fσ(xσ)) ⊢ ∀x. φσ∗(Fσ(xσ
∗)). This is done by introducing
an eigenvariable h for the right hand-side universal quantification, and instantiating the
left hand-side one by (λσ. hσ∗). The resulting goal φσ(Fσ(hσ
∗)) ⊢ φσ∗(Fσ(hσ
∗)) is
obtained by induction on B := λσ.Fσ(hσ∗).
Notice that although we have made some terms larger when moving from Fσx to
Fσ(xσ), the formula structure of B is always kept intact, which is what matters in this
induction.
• We now treat the case of the least fixed point, greatest fixed point being obtained in a
symmetric way. For clarity we suppose that the fixed point has arity one, and leave out
the other fixed point parameters of B which can be re-introduced without interfering at
the cost of very heavy notations. We have to build a derivation of φΓσ(µ(B
′σ)(tσ)) ⊢
φΓ
∗
σ∗
(µ(B′σ)(tσ)), that is:
µ(λp′λx. φ
Γ,〈p,σ,p′〉
σ (B
′σp(xσ)))
−→
t ⊢ µ(λp∗λx. φ
Γ∗,〈p,σ∗,p∗〉
σ∗
(B′σp(xσ∗)))(λσ∗.tσ)
We proceed by applying the induction rule with the right hand-side as the invariant:
S := [µ(λp∗λx. φ
Γ∗,〈p,σ∗,p∗〉
σ∗
(B′σp(xσ∗)))]σσ∗
One premise of the induction rule is thus an instance of the identity, the other is the proof
of invariance, which conclusion must be:
(λp′λx. φ
Γ,〈p,σ,p′〉
σ (B
′σp(xσ)))S x ⊢ S x
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After an unfolding of µ on the right hand-side, we finally obtain a goal which can be
obtained by induction hypothesis, with an extended family of Fi and σi:
(λp′. φ
Γ,〈p,σ,p′〉
σ (B
′σp(xσ)))[µ(λp∗λx. φ
Γ∗,〈p,σ∗,p∗〉
σ∗
(B′σp(xσ∗)))]σσ∗
⊢ (λp∗. φ
Γ∗,〈p,σ∗,p∗〉
σ∗
(B′σp(xσ)))(µ(λp∗λx. φ
Γ∗,〈p,σ∗,p∗〉
σ∗
(B′σp(xσ∗))))
Recall that we are doing an induction on B: although we unfolded a fixed point, the
process shall not go through the recursive occurences of the fixed point (e.g., the S sub-
stituted for p′) but treats the predicate variables in B as a base case.
• If B is of the form λσ−→p . pi(tσ), then σ = σiσ
′ and σ∗ = σ∗
i
σ′ for some σ′, and we
have:
λ
−→
p′. φΓσ(Bσ
−→p ) = λ
−→
p′. ∇σ′.p′i(λσi.tσ) λ
−→
p∗. φΓ
∗
σ∗(Bσ
−→p ) = λ
−→
p∗. ∇σ′.p∗i (λσ
∗
i .tσ)
Our goal is thus to build a derivation of:
∇σ′. [Fi]
σi
σ∗
i
(λσi.tσ) ⊢ ∇σ
′. Fi(λσ
∗
i .tσ
∗)
which is simply an instance of the identity:
∇σ′. Fi(λσ
∗
i .tσ) ⊢ ∇σ
′. Fi(λσ
∗
i .tσ)

Proposition 3.4 For any σ, the provability of Σ;Γ ⊢ C implies that of φσ(Σ;Γ ⊢ C).
Proof. By a simple induction on the structure of the proof, which is preserved by the
transformation. We show here a couple key cases. Propositional cases are most trivial.
Equality is trivial on the right, slightly less on the left, where
{((xi)i;Γ(xi)i ⊢ C(xi)i)θ : θ ∈ mgu(u(xi)i
.
= v(xi)i}
(xi)i;Γ(xi)i, u(xi)i = v(xi)i ⊢ C(xi)i
is transformed by induction hypothesis into
{((x′
i
)i; φσ(Γ(x
′
i
σ)i) ⊢ φσ(C(x
′
i
σ)i))θ
′ : θ′ ∈ mgu((λσ.u(x′
i
σ)i)
.
= (λσ.v(x′
i
σ)i))}
(x′
i
)i; φσ(Γ(x
′
i
σ)i), (λσ.u(x
′
i
σ)i) = (λσ.v(x
′
i
σ)i) ⊢ φσ(C(x
′
i
σ)i)
The cases of first-order quantifications are straightforward:
(xi)i, x; . . . ⊢ P(xi)ix
(xi)i; . . . ⊢ ∀x. P(xi)ix  
(x′
i
)i, x
′; . . . ⊢ φσ(P(x
′
i
σ)ix
′σ)
(x′
i
)i; . . . ⊢ ∀x
′. φσ(P(x
′
i
σ)ix
′σ)
(xi)i; . . . ⊢ P(xi)i(t(xi)i)
(xi)i; . . . ⊢ ∃x. P(xi)ix  
(x′
i
)i; . . . ⊢ φσ(P(x
′
i
σ)i(t(x
′
i
σ)i))
(x′
i
)i; . . . ⊢ ∃x
′. φσ(P(x
′
i
σ)i(x
′σ))
x′ := λσ.t(x′
i
σ)i
Finally, thanks to Corollary 3.2, fixed point rules can also be translated into lifted in-
stances of themselves, plus some corrective cuts. 
Proposition 3.8 For any formula W ∈ W (resp. S ∈ S) it is provable that W ⊃ ∇x. W
(resp. ∇x. S ⊃ S ).
Proof. Let α be the type of x, the unused generic variable. We denote by [F]↑ the formula
λx′. ∀x. x′ = (λ . x) ⊃ F x. If F has type γ → o, then [F] has type (α → γ) → o.
Conversely, we denote by [F′]↓ the formula λx. F′(λ . x). These conversions satisfy the
following equivalences:
∀x. Fx ≡ [F]↑(λ . x) ∧ F′(λ . x) ≡ [F′]↓x
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We establish by simultaneous induction on S and W, for any generic context σ and
any families of fixed points (Fi)i of types ((σi → γi) → o)i and (F
′
j
) j of types ((αζ j →
δ j) → o) j, that for B ∈ S:
(λ
−→
p′′λ
−→
q′′. φΓ
′
x:α,σ(Bσ
−→p−→q ))([Fi]
↑)i(F
′
j) j ⊢ (λ
−→
p′λ
−→
q′. φΓσ(Bσ
−→p−→q ))(Fi)i([F
′
j]
↓) j
and for B ∈ W:
(λ
−→
p′λ
−→
q′. φΓσ(Bσ
−→p−→q ))(Fi)i([F
′
j]
↓) j ⊢ (λp
′′λq′′. φΓ
′
x:α,σ(Bσ
−→
p′
−→
q′))([Fi]
↑)i(F
′
j) j
Where Γ := (〈pi, σi, p
′
i
〉)i, (〈q j, ζ j, q
′
j
〉) j and Γ
′ := (〈pi, ασi, p
′′
i
〉)i, (〈q j, αζ j, q
′′
j
〉) j.
The two inductive processes of weakening and strengthening are interleaved, the
switching from one to the other being done when treating the negation involved in ⊃. When
encoutering a least fixed point on the left, an induction step will be done, adding on the left
a corrected parameter ([•]↑ or [•]↓) and its bare version on the right. With greatest fixed
points, the corrected version appears on the right. When in the strengthening (resp. weaken-
ing) phase, the new parameters will be fixed points over strengthenable (resp. weakenable)
bodies νS or µS (resp. νW or µW). By monotonicity, only strenghthenable parame-
ters will be used in the strenghtening phase in the base case where B is a projection, e.g.,
λ−→pλ−→q .pi(tσ). However, this is not exploited in the proof, allowing us to mix weakenable
and strengthenable parameters, thus having two instead of four families of parameters.
Having outlined the proof, we now only detail a few key steps of strengthening:
• For strengthening, universal quantification is harmless. We basically have to derive:
∀x′′. φxσ(Bσ(x
′′xσ)) ⊢ ∀x′. φσ(Bσ(x
′σ))
After introducing the eigenvariable x′ :: σ → γ on the right we instantiate the universal
on the left with (λ λσ.x′′σ).
• The case of existential quantification crucially relies on guardedness, but is straightfor-
ward by definition of the guard. An eigenvariable x′′ :: ασ → γ is introduced on the left,
together with a guard hypothesis. After a cut against the formula provided by Defini-
tion 3.6, the unification of the left equality restricts x′′ to be some (λ . x′) and provides a
proof of the guard for x′. This is all we need to instantiate the right hand-side existential,
prove the guard, and conclude by induction hypothesis.
• Suppose B = λσλ−→pλ−→q . pi(tσ), with σ of the form σiσ
′. Then φΓ
′
x:α,σ(Bσ
−→p−→q ) is
∇σ′. p′′
i
(λ σi. tσiσ
′) and φΓσ(Bσ
−→p−→q ) is ∇σ′. p′
i
(λσi. tσiσ
′). Thus, we have to prove
the following, which is actually an equivalence as remarked above:
∇σ′. [Fi]
↑(λ σi. tσiσ
′) ⊢ ∇σ′. Fi(λσi. tσiσ
′)
• If B is a least fixed point λσλ−→pλ−→q . µ(B′σ−→p−→q )(tσ), then we apply the induction rule
with the invariant [S ]↑ where
S := µ(λX′λx. (λ
−→
p′λ
−→
q′. φ
Γ,〈X,σ,X′〉
σ (B
′σ−→p−→q Xx))(Fi)i([F
′
j]
↓) j)
The main premise of the induction rule is trivial, of the form [S ]↑(lambda . t) ⊢ S t.
In the invariance premise (roughly of the form φ(B)[S ]↑x′ ⊢ [S ]↑x′), the universal and
implications resulting from the conversion from S to [S ]↑ are introduced, and the left rule
for equality changes the eigenvariable x′ into some vacuous abstraction (λ . x). After
a right unfolding the resulting sequent can be derived by induction, with an extended
family of (Fi)i.

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